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APPLICATION OF THE SEISMIC RISK EVALUATION 
FOCUSING ON THE SAFETY OF EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS 
 
Yuko MURACHI*, Masaki TSUBOTA*, Yuji TAKAHASHI** 
* KOZO KEIKAKU Engineering Inc. 
** Building Research Institute, Dr. Eng. 
 
ABSTRACT: In order to evaluate seismic risk of industrials, it is necessary to consider not only the physical 
and economical damage but also casualties from the viewpoint of Business Continuity (BC) and Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). For a single building, one of the authors, Takahashi et al. (2002, 2004), 
proposed a seismic risk management methodology, and demonstrated that the life-cycle cost is useful to 
explain a reduction/increment of physical and economical damage. In this paper, the methodology is 
extended to the seismic risk management of multiple buildings. As a case study, we deal with multiple 
industrial buildings, owned and operated by a single company. These building are assumed to be located near 
the ten major harbors in Japan. In dealing with an industrial building that accommodates many employees, it 
is significant to consider their safety. Thus this paper focuses on the computation of the probabilities that the 
building incurs severe damage states, as the primary indexes of employees’ safety. The estimated damage 
probabilities of the buildings will assist the manager of the company to decide on the priority of seismic 
upgrade of the existing buildings upon its limited budget. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Mid Niigata Earthquake, on October 23, 2004, 
revealed that the distinctive negative effects of 
seismic events on industrial facilities are startlingly 
apparent.  One of the largest electric plants in Ojiya 
city was closed about two months because of 
physical damage of facilities and disruption of 
lifeline-utility system.  They reported that the 
earthquake damaged up to 50 billion yen including 
repair and replacement costs of facilities and 
business inventories losses. Consequently, it caused 
serious impacts on the business continuity of the 
company.  Another example, an automobile 
component plant could not resume its speedometer 
assembly line, which caused its senior motor 
company to halt automobile production at four plants 
elsewhere in Japan. There were many other plants 
shut down for more than one week, and then the total 
economic impact was estimated to be approximately 
300 billion yen only for the commercial and 
industrial business.  Fortunately, the Mid Niigata 
Earthquake happened in Sunday evening, and there 
were no casualties in the industrial facilities. 
However, it is necessary to mitigate not only the 
physical and economical damage but also casualties 
from the viewpoint of Business Continuity (BC) and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
 
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research 
Promotion (HERP) organized by the Japanese 
government has been announcing the probability of 
large earthquake that are expected to occur around 
Japan.  Among them, some were forecasted to 
occur in very high probabilities within the next 30 
years, e.g., 99% for Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake 
( Mw=7.5 ), 50% for Tonankai earth- quake 
( Mw=8.1 ) and 40% for Nankai earthquake 
( Mw=8.4 ).  Near such seismic sources, a manager 
of a company should prepare for the possibly 
imminent earthquake in the design of a new building 
or upgrade of an existing one.  However, the 
manager should be based upon limited budget, and 
thus they would be reluctant to invest in future 
events.  Structural researchers and engineers have 
been developing “hard” seismic technologies, for 
example, strong and ductile frames, bearing walls, 
energy dissipation dampers, base isolation systems 
and so on.  On the other hand, “soft” technology to 
persuade the manager of company to invest in such 
sophisticated “hard” technology is not sufficiently 
developed. This causes the barrier to the efficient 
spread of safer buildings in our society. 
 
1.1 Background 
Under these situations, Takahashi et al. (2002, 2004) 
proposed a seismic risk management methodology 
aiming to persuade building owners to invest in 
appropriate seismic systems. Here, seismic risk 
management is defined as a decision problem among 
multiple design alternatives. Alternatives for seismic 
design or upgrade may be an existing frame designed 
according to a design code, with strong and ductile 
frames, with bearing walls, with energy dissipation 
systems, with base isolation systems, purchasing 
earthquake insurances, or a combination of any of 
these. The alternative that minimizes the total 
expenditure, i.e., the life-cycle cost, to the building 
owner including the initial cost and the cumulative 
damage cost due to all earthquakes that occur during 
the lifetime of the building, is chosen as the optimum 
selection. The expected life-cycle cost of each 
alternative is formulated so that we can directly 
introduce earthquake probabilities in the surrounding 
seismic sources, which have been constructed by 
HERP or WGCEP (1999).  In addition, for com- 
putation of the expected damage cost due to earth- 
quakes of a given magnitude, we can utilize up-to- 
date simulation techniques developed in the relevant 
fields such as seismology, geotechnical engineering, 
structural engineering, and social economics.   
 
The proposed methodology was applied to various 
single buildings, such as office, hospital, city hall, 
detached house and so on (Working Group on 
Seismic Risk Management (WGSRM), 2005).  
Especially to the single industrial building, Murach 
et al. (2005) also applied the methodology, and 
demonstrated that a passive energy dissipation 
system using the oil dampers is effective in reducing 
the life-cycle cost. 
 
1.2 Objective 
For multiple buildings owned by a government, a 
local authority, a private company or of course an 
industrial, it is more important to apply the risk 
management methodology to persuade the owner or 
manager of an entity in seismically active regions to 
adopt appropriate investments.  In the previous 
studies, it is demonstrated that the life-cycle cost is 
useful to explain a reduction/ increment of physical 
and economical damage.  However, dealing with 
issues related to the industrials, it is also significant 
to take into account the safety of their employees. 
 
In this paper, the seismic risk management 
methodology by Takahashi et al. (2002, 2004) is 
extended to multiple industrial buildings.  As an 
index to express the safety of the employees, we 
estimate the probabilities that each building incurs 
several structural damage states. The selected 
buildings are assumed to be located near the ten 
major harbors in Japan, such as Tokyo, Oosaka, 
Niigata, Kochi ports and so on. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Generally, building is surrounded by a number of 
seismic sources.  Even if it is confined one’s 
attention to only one seismic source, it is impossible 
to determine the certain magnitude to be occurred 
from that particular source.  To estimate the 
probability of structural damage, it is necessary to 
take account for all possible earthquakes surrounding 
the building, i.e., all seismic sources and various 
magnitudes. 
 
For a given lifetime lifet  of a building, the 
probability of failure ( )lifeFail tP  is estimated as 
 
( ) ( ){ }∏ −−=
AllEQ
lifeFaillifeFail tEQPtP ,11   (1) 
 
where ( )lifeFail tP  is defined as the building is fallen 
down at least one time under considering all possible 
earthquakes EQ  during lifet .  ( )lifeFail tEQP ,  is the 
probability of the building fallen down at least one 
time due to specific earthquake event EQ  for lifet . 
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where ( )lifeEQ tnP ,  is the probability of earthquake  
event EQ , n  is the number of occurrence of the 
earthquake EQ  for lifet .  This term corresponds to 
probabilistic model of earthquake occurrence, and it 
can account not only for historical earthquake data 
but also for recently acquired information on 
activities of seismic sources, such as HERP or the 
research report of the National Institute for Land and 
Infrastructure Management (NILIM, 2003) in Japan. 
 
( )EQPSafe  is the probability of safety of the building 
under the earthquake event EQ .  This term should 
be computed for a specified magnitude jm  in a 
given source. And relevant processes are illustrated 
in Figure 1: fault rupture in the seismic source, 
elastic wave propagation, surface soil amplification, 
and dynamic response of building. 
 
As mentioned previously, in theory, any simulation 
model can be used in estimating the probability of 
safety ( )EQPSafe  in Equation (2). However, in 
practice, an engineer is supposed to prepare a 
“menu” including several “courses” corresponding 
to needs from clients, i.e., building owners.  Some 
clients may need the most exact solutions with much 
money, but others with small budgets may request 
rough estimation.  Figure 2 gives an example of a 
menu with three courses, cheap, middle and 
expensive.  If the expensive course is ordered, an 
engineer can spend much time in the specification of 
the parameters and computation, and give one of the 
most reliable solutions.  On the other hand, if the 
cheap course is requested, the engineer can show the 
result instantly and cheaply with simple simulations.  
Figure 2 is just current example, and it should be 
updated by reflecting the progress of simulation 
models and computation technologies in relevant 
academic fields aiming to provide clients with better 
decision- making tools with less expense. 
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Figure1. Events from fault rupture to damage states: 
safety or failure 
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Figure2. Example of current simulation models for 
the computation of the probability of safe 
 
In a decision-making on the priority of earthquake 
retrofit of multiple buildings, the simulation models 
of the “cheap course" in Figure 2 may be currently 
adequate in terms of computation time and cost.  
Following Takahashi (2004), the simplified 
simulation models in the “cheap course”, which 
utilizes Capacity Spectrum method, is adapted for 
the case study in the next section. 
 
3. APPLICATION 
 
3.1 Buildings under consideration 
A two-story existing industrial building is considered 
here (Figure 3).  This building consists of steel 
frames and steel bracings, and has a total area of 
about 2,900 m2.  The structure was designed in 
1966 based on the old Japanese building code.  
Then the remaining lifetime of the building is 
assumed to be 30 years, that is, lifet = 30 years in 
Equations (1) and (2).  For the detailed information 
of this building, refer to the previous study (Murachi 
et al, 2005), which evaluated the life-cycle cost using 
the “middle course” simulation in Figure 2. In this 
study, the probability of safety is estimated only for 
the existing building. The comparison with the 
damage probability of upgraded buildings will be 
addressed in the future study. 
 
 
Figure3. Selected industrial building 
 
Ten identical industrial buildings mentioned above 
are distributed near the ten major harbors in Japan, 
as shown in Figure 4. Geomorphological land 
classification of each location can be assigned by 
referring to the Digital National Land Information 
(1992), as shown in Table 1.   
 
  
Figure4. Building located near the ten major harbors 
 
Table1.Land classification at each location 
No. Location Land Classification 
1 Tomakomai Port Delta (sand) 
2 Sendai Port Delta (mud, clay) 
3 Niigata Port Delta (sand) 
4 Tokyo Port Reclaimed land 
5 Shimizu Port Delta (sand) 
6 Nagoya Port Reclaimed land 
7 Oosaka Port Delta (sand) 
8 Hiroshima Port Reclaimed land 
9 Kochi Port Reclaimed land 
10 Kita-Kyusyu Port Delta (mud, clay) 
 
Tomakomai Port 
Sendai Port 
Niigata Port 
Tokyo Port 
Shimizu Port 
Nagoya Port 
Oosaka Port 
Kochi Port 
Hiroshima Port 
Kita-Kyusyu  
3.2 Activity of seismic source 
We make use of the seismic models constructed by 
NILIM (2003) in this analysis. NILIM (2003) listed 
numerous seismic sources around Japan, and 
grouped them into three types: 
 
(A) Plate-boundary sources, 
(B) Active faults, and 
(C) Back-ground sources. 
 
The Poisson model, which is one particular form of 
renewal models, is adequate for earthquakes that 
frequently occur during the lifetime of the building.  
However, for infrequent earthquake, a non-Poisson 
renewal model may be more appropriate. Among 
non-Poisson renewal models, the Brownian Passage 
Time (BPT) model (Matthews, 2002) has been 
applied to long-term estimation of earthquake 
probabilities by WGCEP (1999) and HERP. 
 
Table2. Seismic sources affected for each site      *M: Magnitude, D: Minimum Distance from the source 
(A). Shimizu Port 
PEQ(1,30) No. Seismic Source M D (km) 
Annual 
Probability Poisson Poisson+BPT 
1 Tokai earthquake 8 11.64 2.2E-01 2.2E-01 7.8E-01 
2 Kanto earthquake 7.9 43.24 1.3E-01 1.3E-01 3.0E-03 
3 Tou-Nankai earthquake 8.1 79.95 2.9E-01 2.9E-01 6.5E-01 
4 Fujigawa-Kakou active fault zone 8 15.68 2.7E-02 2.7E-02 1.9E-01 
5 Tanna acrive fault zone 7.4 45.87 2.5E-02 2.5E-02 8.6E-40 
6 Itoigawa-Sizuoka Tectonic Line active fault zone 8 60.72 3.0E-02 3.0E-02 1.5E-01 
7 Kannawa Kozu -Matsuda zctive fault zone 8 62.91 1.0E-02 1.0E-02 3.8E-02 
8 Isehara active fault 7 89.87 9.1E-03 9.1E-03 1.0E-06 
9 Atera active fault zone 7.9 101.49 1.7E-02 1.7E-02 6.8E-11 
10 Darumayama active fault zone 6.8 27.64 1.2E-02 1.2E-02 1.2E-02 
(B). Kochi Port        *MTL: Mid Techno Line active fault system 
PEQ(1,30) No. Seismic Source M D (km) 
Annual 
Probability Poisson Poisson+BPT 
1 Nankai Earthquake 8.4 29.21  1.1E-02 2.8E-01 5.2E-01 
2 MTL, Shikoku-Kii zone, North foot part of the Ishizuchi Mt. 7.6 51.53  1.0E-03 3.0E-02 2.0E-01 
3 MTL, Shikoku-Kii zone, South foot part of the Sanuki Mt. 8.2 53.46  1.3E-03 3.7E-02 2.3E-02 
4 MTL, Kawakami active fault zone 6.9 67.41  7.1E-04 2.1E-02 5.0E-02 
5 MTL, Iyo active fault zone 7 77.72  1.8E-04 5.4E-03 6.8E-20 
6 Nagao active fault zone 7.1 93.28  5.9E-05 1.8E-03 1.9E-03 
7 Tokushima plain active fault zone 6.7 97.33  6.7E-04 2.0E-02 8.4E-02 
8 Tunatsukemori active fault 6.6 42.36  5.9E-04 1.7E-02 1.7E-02 
9 Yasuda active fault 7.1 42.37  2.2E-03 6.3E-02 6.3E-02 
10 Gyodozaki active fault 6.9 58.68  7.7E-04 2.3E-02 2.3E-02 
(C). Kita-Kyusyu Port 
PEQ(1,30) No. Seismic Source M D (km) 
Annual 
Probability Poisson Poisson+BPT 
1 Kokura east active fault 6.9 1.44  4.5E-04 1.4E-02 5.7E-10 
2 Kikukawa active fault 7 31.12  1.4E-04 4.3E-03 5.9E-03 
3 Nishiyama active fault zone 7.3 33.32  1.0E-04 3.0E-03 2.7E-18 
4 Kego active fault zone 7 54.68  6.3E-05 1.9E-03 8.6E-03 
5 Minoo active fault zone 7.2 65.18  7.7E-04 2.3E-02 7.1E-29 
6 Beppu-Haneyama active fault zone 7.9 76.63  5.0E-04 1.5E-02 2.1E-01 
7 Futagawa active fault zone 7.1 109.71 1.6E-04 4.8E-03 5.0E-02 
8 Fukuchiyama active fault zone 7 19.11  3.1E-04 9.3E-03 9.3E-03 
9 Sibuki active fault 6.8 38.71  4.0E-05 1.2E-03 1.2E-03 
10 Kamatouge - Koishiwara 6.6 43.35  5.3E-05 1.6E-03 1.6E-03 
 
In NILIM (2003), for plate-boundary sources, the 
occurrence rates of infrequent earthquakes are 
estimated utilizing the BPT model.  For active 
faults, if the information on the time of the last 
earthquake is available, the BPT model is also used. 
For the other earthquakes, the Poisson model is 
adapted. As an example, Table 2 lists the ten seismic 
sources, which are the most influential on Shimizu, 
Kochi and Kita-Kyusyu port, respectively. Notably, 
only the plate-boundary sources and the active faults 
appear in Table 2. The back-ground sources turn out 
to be much less affective, and are omitted here. 
 
3.3 Simulation for probability of safety 
In “cheap course” in Figure 2, Capacity Spectrum 
method is applied to the estimation of the dynamic 
response of a building (Takahashi, 2004). To 
evaluate the demand spectrum ( )%5, =hTSv  at a 
building site from each seismic source, the 
attenuation relationship by Yamauchi et al. (2001) is 
used here. 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )TchTbr
TbMTbTb
hTS
i
v
++−
++=
=
410
210
10
log
%5,log
　　　
　　   (3) 
 
where M  is magnitude, r  is minimum distance 
from sources (km), h  is depth from hypocenter 
(km).  ( )Tb0 , ( )Tb1 , ( )Tb2  and ( )Tb4  are the 
coefficients determined from regression analyses.   
( )Tci  is the site factor that accounts for 
geomorphological land classification at each site, 
and is given for the eleven land categories. Using 
geomorphological land classifications for each study 
location (see Table 1), ( )Tb0 , ( )Tb1 , ( )Tb2 , ( )Tb4  
and ( )Tci  are obtained from the figures in 
Yamauchi et al. (2001). 
 
The two-story steel building with steel bracings is 
modeled as a two-degree of freedom system. To 
depict the capacity curve of the equivalent SDOF 
system (Figure 5), the push-over analysis is 
performed on the 2 DOF model. Then, peak dynamic 
response of the equivalent SDOF system is evaluated 
as the intersection of the capacity curve and demand 
spectrum. Peak response of the 2 DOF system is 
estimated by multiplying the peak response of the 
SDOF model by the participation function of the 
original 2 DOF model. 
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Figure5. Capacity curve for the industrial building 
 
Based on the peak inter-story drift ratios of the 2 
DOF model, a probability of safety ( )EQPSafe  in 
Equation (2) is estimated for each seismic source 
using fragility curves by FEMA (1999). In order to 
evaluate the two levels of severity of casualties, one 
is the dead and the injured and the other is only deal- 
ing with the dead, probabilities of two damage states 
of the building are estimated: damage states of “at 
least moderate” and “at least extensive” (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 indicates that Shimizu port exhibits the 
highest damage probabilities, i.e., the employees at 
Shimizu port are exposed to the most intensive 
hazard. Therefore the upgrade of the building at 
Shimizu port is the most urgent among those of the 
ten facilities. The buildings at Oosaka and Kochi 
ports are ranked in the second and third, respectively. 
The damage probabilities estimated applying only 
eqB MQ
( )cmδ
Poisson model and ones applying BPT and Poisson 
models are listed in the third and fourth columns, 
respectively, in Table 3 (A) and (B). At all sites other 
than Tokyo port, the probability based on both BPT 
and Poisson models (fourth column) are higher than 
one based on only Poisson model (third column).  
On the other hand, at Tokyo port, the probabilities 
based on BPT model are much smaller than the other 
one. This is because the elapsed time since the last 
earthquake is much shorter than its interval time, for 
plate-boundary sources and active faults around 
Tokyo port, and BPT model can reflect such time 
dependency of the occurrence rates of earthquakes. 
 
Table3. Probability of structural damage 
(A). Probability of “at least moderate” damage 
state of building in the next 30 years. (%) 
No. Location Poisson Poisson + BPT 
1 Tomakomai Port 1.82 11.06 
2 Sendai Port 8.68 17.15 
3 Niigata Port 0.86 3.41 
4 Tokyo Port 11.39 1.00 
5 Shimizu Port 49.98 91.68 
6 Nagoya Port 11.62 19.42 
7 Oosaka Port 41.01 63.57 
8 Hiroshima Port 1.02 1.23 
9 Kochi Port 29.67 52.16 
10 Kita-Kyusyu Port 2.72 8.38 
 
(B). Probability of “at least extensive” damage 
state of building in the next 30 years. (%) 
No. Location Poisson Poisson + BPT 
1 Tomakomai Port 0.27 1.94 
2 Sendai Port 0.52 1.30 
3 Niigata Port 0.04 0.23 
4 Tokyo Port 0.39 0.01 
5 Shimizu Port 19.79 65.47 
6 Nagoya Port 0.28 0.13 
7 Oosaka Port 5.96 11.33 
8 Hiroshima Port 0.00106 0.00026 
9 Kochi Port 9.93 17.97 
10 Kita-Kyusyu Port 0.15 0.03 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, the seismic risk management 
methodology for single buildings, proposed by 
Takahashi et al. (2002, 2004), is extended to multiple 
buildings. To focus on life safety, we formulate the 
probabilities that a building incurs some damages 
during its lifetime, by extending the equation of 
life-cycle cost by Takahashi et al. (2002, 2004). In 
the case study, the selected industrial buildings are 
assumed to be distributed near ten major harbors in 
Japan. The probabilities of two damage states, “at 
least moderate” and “at least extensive”, of each 
building in the next 30 years are estimated as an 
index to evaluate the safety of employees. In the 
analysis, up-to-date knowledge obtained in the field 
of seismology and earthquake engineering is 
beneficially utilized, e.g., seismological models by 
NILIM (2003) including BPT model, and Capacity 
Spectrum method for earthquake response of 
buildings. The results evaluated in this paper are one 
of the useful information for the manager of an 
organization to prioritize the upgrading of its 
existing multiple buildings. 
 
The models utilized in the case study may be 
currently reliable, because they were constructed by 
sophisticating existing models. However, it is almost 
impossible to obtain models that simulate physical 
phenomena perfectly. Thus the engineers would be 
expected to update their models according to the 
progress in the related academic fields. For example, 
in March 2005, HERP published more detailed 
seismological models after NILIM (2003). Such 
models would be introduced in the future study. 
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